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Abstract
I perioden 2016–2022 ble det innført en øvre grense for samlet uføretrygd og barnetillegg på 95 prosent av tidligere inntekt. Noen uføre fikk med dette et betydelig redusert barnetillegg (Lamøy 2022). I denne artikkelen undersøker jeg om regelendringen førte til færre nye uføre og økt arbeidsdeltakelse.
I arbeids- og velferdspolitikken er det et overordnet prinsipp at det skal lønne seg å arbeide framfor å motta ytelser. Før 2016 kunne enkelte få mer i uføretrygd og barnetillegg enn de hadde hatt i arbeidsinntekt. Et viktig argument for regelendringen, var at dette ikke ga økonomiske insentiver til å gå tilbake i arbeid hvis helsen tillot det.
Jeg anslår at regelendringer perioden 2016–2018 hvert år berørte 3 500 til 4 000 AAP-mottakere. Disse fikk et lavere barnetillegg hvis de ble uføretrygdet enn de fikk før regelendringen.
Det viktigste funnet mitt er at regelendringen ikke førte til en klar nedgang i antall nye uføre i perioden som helhet. Det var imidlertid en svak reduksjon i nye uføre i 2016. I 2016 var det flere som mottok AAP lenger og således færre som startet med uføretrygd. Endringen er statistisk svak og gjelder kun i starten av året. Man bør derfor være varsom i å tolke det som effekt fra regelendringen.
Videre finner jeg ingen tegn til at endringen førte til økt arbeidsdeltagelse. Konklusjonen blir dermed at de økonomiske insentivene i regelendringen ikke hadde de forventede virkningene, altså at flere ville arbeide fremfor å motta uføretrygd.
Between 2016 and 2022, a maximum limit was introduced so that the sum of disability insurance benefits and child supplements could not exceed 95 percent of recipients’ pre-disability income. As a result, some recipients experienced a substantial reduction in their child supplements (Lamøy 2022). In this article, I examine whether the policy change led to fewer new disability insurance recipients and increased labor supply. A general principle in labor and welfare policy is that work should be more financially rewarding than receiving benefits. Prior to 2016, some individuals could receive more disability insurance and child supplements than pre-disability income. A key argument for the policy change was that this situation did not provide an economic incentive to return to work if health permitted it. I estimate that the policy changes introduced from 2016 to 2018 affected 3500–4000 recipients of Work Assessment Allowance (AAP) each year. Under the new rules, these individuals would receive lower child supplements if they transitioned to disability insurance. My main finding is that the policy change did not result in a clear reduction in the number of new disability insurance recipients over the period as a whole. However, there was a slight decrease in new recipients in 2016. In that year, more people remained on AAP for longer, and thus fewer transitioned to disability insurance. The changes observed are statistically weak and appear only at the beginning of the year. One should therefore be cautious in interpreting them as effects of the policy change. Furthermore, I find no indication that the policy change led to increased labor supply. I therefore conclude that the financial incentives introduced by the policy change did not have the expected effects — namely, that more individuals would choose work rather than receive disability insurance.
Between 2016 and 2022, a maximum limit was introduced so that the sum of disability insurance benefits and child supplements could not exceed 95 percent of recipients’ pre-disability income. As a result, some recipients experienced a substantial reduction in their child supplements (Lamøy 2022). In this article, I examine whether the policy change led to fewer new disability insurance recipients and increased labor supply. A general principle in labor and welfare policy is that work should be more financially rewarding than receiving benefits. Prior to 2016, some individuals could receive more disability insurance and child supplements than pre-disability income. A key argument for the policy change was that this situation did not provide an economic incentive to return to work if health permitted it. I estimate that the policy changes introduced from 2016 to 2018 affected 3500–4000 recipients of Work Assessment Allowance (AAP) each year. Under the new rules, these individuals would receive lower child supplements if they transitioned to disability insurance. My main finding is that the policy change did not result in a clear reduction in the number of new disability insurance recipients over the period as a whole. However, there was a slight decrease in new recipients in 2016. In that year, more people remained on AAP for longer, and thus fewer transitioned to disability insurance. The changes observed are statistically weak and appear only at the beginning of the year. One should therefore be cautious in interpreting them as effects of the policy change. Furthermore, I find no indication that the policy change led to increased labor supply. I therefore conclude that the financial incentives introduced by the policy change did not have the expected effects — namely, that more individuals would choose work rather than receive disability insurance.