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Sammendrag
I dag reduseres arbeidsavklaringspenger (AAP) mot antall arbeidede timer som mottakerne rapporterer til NAV annenhver uke. Særlig én ulempe med dagens system, er at det kan gi lave insentiver til å jobbe ved lav timelønn. I denne artikkelen undersøker vi mulige konsekvenser av å avkorte AAP mot arbeidsinntekt, slik det blir gjort for uføretrygd og overgangsstønad. Vi undersøker hvor mange som vil bli påvirket ved en eventuell omlegging, hvem som påvirkes og hvordan en eventuell omlegging burde utformes. De som vil bli påvirket er først og fremst AAP-mottakere som er i arbeid. I gjennomsnitt har 26 prosent av AAP-mottakere noe arbeidsinntekt, og gjennomsnittlig arbeidsinntekt for samtlige mottakere er rundt 6 000 kroner per måned. Til sammenlikning rapporterer omtrent like mange at de har vært i arbeid på meldekortet, og om lag 3,5 arbeidstimer per uke i gjennomsnitt. Unge mottakere og de uten et arbeidsforhold før AAP, jobber minst. Menn jobber mindre enn kvinner. De med psykiske lidelser og mottakere med lang varighet jobber også relativt sett lite. De som vil komme dårligere ut hvis AAP avkortes mot arbeidsinntekt, og ikke arbeidstimer, er først og fremst mottakere med høy arbeidsinntekt. Mottakere med lav arbeidsinntekt vil stort sett komme bedre ut. Hvis insentivene til å jobbe skal opprettholdes, burde avkortningen være lavere basert på arbeidsinntekt enn for arbeidstimer. Dette skyldes at mange mottakere har liten eller ingen inntekt før AAP, og kan forvente å tjene mer ved en fulltidsstilling. Sammenliknet med dagens avkortning for uføretrygd, der trygden blir avkortet med om lag 66 øre per krone arbeidsinntekt over 0,4 G, burde avkortningen av AAP være lavere. Spesielt burde avkortningen per krone arbeidsinntekt være lavere. Av hensynet til å gi mottakerne insentiver til å jobbe noe i det hele tatt, burde det også på AAP være et fribeløp.
Today, work assessment allowance benefits (AAP) are reduced based on hours worked which recipients report to NAV every other week. This is, among other things, disadvantageous for those with low salaries, as incentives to work will be low. In this article, we investigate consequences of changing the benefit reduction scheme to being based on labor market earnings instead of hours worked. This would be comparable to current policies regarding disability insurance and transitional benefits. We investigate the numbers of recipients who will be affected, characteristics of those affected and how the alternative policy should be designed. Recipients who work are primarily those who will be affected by the hypothetical policy change. On average, about 26 percent of recipients have some labor market income, and monthly labor market earnings of about 6 000 NOK. A similar share of recipients report to NAV that they have engaged in employment, and report about 3,5 working hours per week on average. Young recipients and those without labor market connection before AAP work the least. Men work less than women. Those with mental impairments and recipients with long spells on AAP work less than the average recipient. Those who would get lower benefits if AAP is reduced based on labor market earnings are primarily those with high earnings. Most recipients with low earnings would receive higher benefits. If policymakers aim to keep incentives to work at the current level, the reduction in AAP benefits based on labor market earnings must be lower than a reduction in benefits based on working hours. This is because recipients’ hourly wages are higher on average compared to past earnings which is used for benefit calculations. Compared to the benefit reduction scheme of disability insurance as of today, where benefits are reduced by 0,66 NOK for every NOK in labor market earnings above 0,4 G, the reduction in AAP benefits should be lower. In particular, the reduction per NOK should be lower. A minimum deduction threshold should also be implemented in order to incentivize recipients to engage in employment.
Today, work assessment allowance benefits (AAP) are reduced based on hours worked which recipients report to NAV every other week. This is, among other things, disadvantageous for those with low salaries, as incentives to work will be low. In this article, we investigate consequences of changing the benefit reduction scheme to being based on labor market earnings instead of hours worked. This would be comparable to current policies regarding disability insurance and transitional benefits. We investigate the numbers of recipients who will be affected, characteristics of those affected and how the alternative policy should be designed. Recipients who work are primarily those who will be affected by the hypothetical policy change. On average, about 26 percent of recipients have some labor market income, and monthly labor market earnings of about 6 000 NOK. A similar share of recipients report to NAV that they have engaged in employment, and report about 3,5 working hours per week on average. Young recipients and those without labor market connection before AAP work the least. Men work less than women. Those with mental impairments and recipients with long spells on AAP work less than the average recipient. Those who would get lower benefits if AAP is reduced based on labor market earnings are primarily those with high earnings. Most recipients with low earnings would receive higher benefits. If policymakers aim to keep incentives to work at the current level, the reduction in AAP benefits based on labor market earnings must be lower than a reduction in benefits based on working hours. This is because recipients’ hourly wages are higher on average compared to past earnings which is used for benefit calculations. Compared to the benefit reduction scheme of disability insurance as of today, where benefits are reduced by 0,66 NOK for every NOK in labor market earnings above 0,4 G, the reduction in AAP benefits should be lower. In particular, the reduction per NOK should be lower. A minimum deduction threshold should also be implemented in order to incentivize recipients to engage in employment.